CVE-2026-73657

Schwachstellenklasse

Trigger.dev is a platform for building and deploying fully managed AI agents and workflows. From 4.4.2 until 4.5.0-rc.4, `POST /api/v1/runs/:runParam/replay` in apps/webapp/app/routes/api.v1.runs.$runParam.replay.ts uses `prisma.taskRun.findUnique({ where: { friendlyId: runParam } })` without a runtimeEnvironmentId filter, then ReplayTaskRunService in apps/webapp/app/v3/services/replayTaskRun.server.ts replays the selected run in the victim environment. Any valid environment API key can therefore replay another tenant's run by friendlyId, consuming victim resources and repeating side effects; when `payloadType: "application/store"` is used, overrideExistingPayloadPacket() calls conditionallyImportPacket() on existingTaskRun.payload without an integrity check, so payload bytes overwritten through a separate object-store path-traversal vulnerability become attacker-controlled input to the victim task. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.0-rc.4.

Quellen

• https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/e1950778e2f2007e2d432b8f8a8fc89531c51f19
• https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/3756
• https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.0-rc.4
• https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-jx48-qfwm-xq67