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CVE-2026-42882

oxyno-zeta/s3-proxy is an aws s3 proxy written in go. Prior to 5.0.0, s3-proxy contains an authentication bypass caused by inconsistent URL path interpretation between the authentication middleware and the bucket handler. The authentication middleware evaluates resource path patterns against the percent-encoded request URI (r.URL.RequestURI()), while the bucket handler constructs S3 object keys from the decoded path (r.URL.Path). This mismatch, combined with the glob library being invoked without a path separator (causing * to match across / boundaries), allows unauthenticated attackers to write to, read from, or delete objects in protected S3 namespaces. Exploitation is possible via three techniques: (1) using * patterns that match across path separators to reach protected routes via path traversal (e.g., /open/foo/drafts/../restricted/), (2) using percent-encoded slashes (%2F) to collapse multiple path segments into a single token at the auth layer while the decoded form resolves to a protected namespace at the storage layer, and (3) using dot-dot segments (../) under ** prefix patterns, where the raw path matches an open route while Go's URL parser resolves the traversal to a pr

क्रिटिकलCWE-22CWE-863 सभी CVE

वीकनेस

oxyno-zeta/s3-proxy is an aws s3 proxy written in go. Prior to 5.0.0, s3-proxy contains an authentication bypass caused by inconsistent URL path interpretation between the authentication middleware and the bucket handler. The authentication middleware evaluates resource path patterns against the percent-encoded request URI (r.URL.RequestURI()), while the bucket handler constructs S3 object keys from the decoded path (r.URL.Path). This mismatch, combined with the glob library being invoked without a path separator (causing * to match across / boundaries), allows unauthenticated attackers to write to, read from, or delete objects in protected S3 namespaces. Exploitation is possible via three techniques: (1) using * patterns that match across path separators to reach protected routes via path traversal (e.g., /open/foo/drafts/../restricted/), (2) using percent-encoded slashes (%2F) to collapse multiple path segments into a single token at the auth layer while the decoded form resolves to a protected namespace at the storage layer, and (3) using dot-dot segments (../) under ** prefix patterns, where the raw path matches an open route while Go's URL parser resolves the traversal to a pr

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