CVE-2026-10668
The Nuvoton NuMaker HSUSBD USB device-controller driver (drivers/usb/udc/udc_numaker.c) armed the control Data IN stage unconditionally (base->CEPTXCNT = len in numaker_hsusbd_ep_trigger). Because the HSUSBD hardware cannot disarm a control Data IN already armed for a previous transfer, a USB host that cancels an in-flight control transfer (timeout) and then issues a new SETUP packet can drive the driver out of sync: stale data may be transmitted in the new transfer and the control endpoint can become permanently stuck NAK'ing every subsequent control transfer. A malicious or buggy host (physical/adjacent attacker driving the bus) can repeatedly cancel-and-re-SETUP to wedge the device's USB control endpoint, denying service to the device's USB function (the device stops enumerating/responding on the control pipe) until a USB reset or re-plug. The flaw is an availability-only denial of service; the FIFO copy loops (bounded by net_buf length and the hardware BUFFULL flag) and the net_buf lifecycle are independent of the arming desync, so there is no out-of-bounds access, use-after-free, or information leak. The fix monitors the IN-token and new-SETUP events (k_event) and only arms co
脆弱性の種類
The Nuvoton NuMaker HSUSBD USB device-controller driver (drivers/usb/udc/udc_numaker.c) armed the control Data IN stage unconditionally (base->CEPTXCNT = len in numaker_hsusbd_ep_trigger). Because the HSUSBD hardware cannot disarm a control Data IN already armed for a previous transfer, a USB host that cancels an in-flight control transfer (timeout) and then issues a new SETUP packet can drive the driver out of sync: stale data may be transmitted in the new transfer and the control endpoint can become permanently stuck NAK'ing every subsequent control transfer. A malicious or buggy host (physical/adjacent attacker driving the bus) can repeatedly cancel-and-re-SETUP to wedge the device's USB control endpoint, denying service to the device's USB function (the device stops enumerating/responding on the control pipe) until a USB reset or re-plug. The flaw is an availability-only denial of service; the FIFO copy loops (bounded by net_buf length and the hardware BUFFULL flag) and the net_buf lifecycle are independent of the arming desync, so there is no out-of-bounds access, use-after-free, or information leak. The fix monitors the IN-token and new-SETUP events (k_event) and only arms co
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