監査で手に入るもの

小さな注文 API のレポートです。各指摘はファイルと行を示し、コードを引用し、攻撃者が何を得るかを説明し、パッチと検証方法で終わります。

このページ用に手で書いたものです。リポジトリは架空で、モデルは呼び出していません。あなたのレポートは、サイトを使っている言語で書かれます。

acme/checkout-api

概要

The service exposes an order API backed by Postgres and a Stripe webhook. Two issues are exploitable by an unauthenticated or lightly authenticated caller: a SQL query built by string concatenation in the order lookup, and an order endpoint that trusts the identifier in the URL without checking who owns it. A Stripe secret is committed in `src/config/env.ts`, which makes rotation the first task regardless of the rest. Session handling and the webhook signature check are sound.

リスクスコア
82
指摘事項
4
  1. 01緊急SQL injection in the order lookupCWE-89

    src/routes/orders.ts:42–46 · 確信度 high · fable + codex

    `GET /orders/:id` builds its query by concatenating the `id` path parameter into SQL. The parameter is taken straight from the URL and never validated, so any caller controls the statement that runs.

    const { rows } = await db.query(
      "select * from orders where id = " + req.params.id,
    );

    影響

    Full read of the orders table, including customer names, addresses and payment references, and a plausible path to writing or dropping data.

    攻撃シナリオ

    A request to `/orders/1 or 1=1` returns every order in the table. `/orders/1; drop table orders --` runs a second statement on a driver that allows it. No account is needed: the route is reachable before the session check on line 39.

    修正

    Pass the identifier as a bound parameter and reject anything that is not a UUID before the query runs.

    修正手順

    1. Validate the parameter: `if (!isUuid(req.params.id)) return res.status(400).json({ error: "Invalid order id." });`
    2. Replace the concatenated query with a parameterized one, as in the patch below.
    3. Search the rest of `src/routes` for the same pattern — `db.query("… " +` — and convert those too.
    4. Add a regression test that requests `/orders/1 or 1=1` and expects 400.

    修正コード

    const { rows } = await db.query(
      "select * from orders where id = $1",
      [req.params.id],
    );

    確認方法

    Replay `GET /orders/1%20or%201=1`: it must answer 400, and the Postgres log must show the parameterized statement with the raw value bound, not interpolated.

  2. 02Any signed-in user can read any orderCWE-639

    src/routes/orders.ts:39–41 · 確信度 high

    The handler checks that a session exists but never compares the order's owner with the caller. The identifier in the URL is the only thing that decides which record is returned.

    if (!req.session?.userId) return res.status(401).end();
    // … no ownership check before the query below

    影響

    Cross-customer data exposure: addresses, totals and payment references belonging to other accounts.

    攻撃シナリオ

    A customer who signs up legitimately can iterate order identifiers and read other customers' orders. Nothing in the logs distinguishes this from normal use.

    修正

    Scope the query to the session's user, so an identifier alone is never enough.

    修正手順

    1. Add `and user_id = $2` to the query and pass `req.session.userId`.
    2. Return 404 rather than 403 when the row is missing, so the endpoint does not confirm which identifiers exist.
    3. Apply the same scoping to `PATCH /orders/:id` and `POST /orders/:id/refund`.

    修正コード

    const { rows } = await db.query(
      "select * from orders where id = $1 and user_id = $2",
      [req.params.id, req.session.userId],
    );
    if (rows.length === 0) return res.status(404).end();

    確認方法

    Sign in as one account and request an order created by another: the response must be 404, and the row must not appear in the body.

  3. 03Stripe secret key committed to the repositoryCWE-798

    src/config/env.ts:12 · 確信度 high · fable + codex

    A live Stripe secret key is assigned as a fallback when the environment variable is missing. Anyone with read access to the repository — or to its history — has the key.

    export const STRIPE_KEY = process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY ?? "sk_live_51H…";

    影響

    Full API access to the payment account, independent of this service.

    攻撃シナリオ

    The key is in every clone and in the commit history. It allows charges, refunds and customer reads against the live account until it is rotated.

    修正

    Rotate the key first, then remove the fallback so a missing variable fails loudly at boot.

    修正手順

    1. Roll the key in the Stripe dashboard now; the committed one must be treated as public.
    2. Replace the fallback with a hard failure, as in the patch.
    3. Purge the value from history (`git filter-repo`) or accept that the old key stays exposed and rely on the rotation.
    4. Add a secret scan to CI so the next one is caught before it merges.

    修正コード

    const key = process.env.STRIPE_SECRET_KEY;
    if (!key) throw new Error("STRIPE_SECRET_KEY is not set");
    export const STRIPE_KEY = key;

    確認方法

    Start the service without `STRIPE_SECRET_KEY`: it must refuse to boot instead of using a built-in value.

  4. 04No rate limit on the refund endpointCWE-770

    src/routes/orders.ts:88 · 確信度 medium

    `POST /orders/:id/refund` performs a Stripe call per request with no limit per account or per order. The handler is also not idempotent: two requests that arrive together can both pass the `status !== "refunded"` check.

    router.post("/orders/:id/refund", requireSession, async (req, res) => {

    影響

    Double refunds and a bill at the payment provider for traffic nobody asked for.

    攻撃シナリオ

    A customer sending the same refund twice within a few milliseconds can have the order refunded twice before the status is written back.

    修正

    Limit the endpoint per account and make the refund idempotent at the database level.

    修正手順

    1. Add a limiter keyed on the session's user, e.g. 5 refunds per hour.
    2. Claim the refund with a conditional update — `update orders set status = 'refunding' where id = $1 and status = 'paid' returning id` — and only call Stripe when a row comes back.
    3. Pass an idempotency key to the Stripe call so a retry cannot charge twice.

    確認方法

    Fire two refund requests for the same order in parallel: exactly one must reach Stripe, and the second must answer 409.

次のステップ

  1. Rotate the committed Stripe key.
  2. Parameterize the order lookup and add the ownership check.
  3. Make refunds idempotent and rate limited.
  4. Add a secret scan and a query-building lint rule to CI.

よくできている点

  • The Stripe webhook verifies the signature against the raw request body before parsing it.
  • Session cookies are `HttpOnly`, `SameSite=Lax` and `Secure` in production.
  • Database credentials come from the environment; only the Stripe key had a committed fallback.
5件のファイルを分析
  • src/routes/orders.ts
  • src/db/client.ts
  • src/lib/session.ts
  • src/config/env.ts
  • src/routes/webhooks.ts
自分のリポジトリを監査する仕組み