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CVE-2026-17052

The Time-aware GPIO syscall verification handler z_vrfy_tgpio_pin_read_ts_ec() in drivers/timeaware_gpio/timeaware_gpio_handlers.c validated only the port device object and passed the caller-supplied timestamp and event_count output pointers to the driver without a K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE() check. The other handlers in the same file (z_vrfy_tgpio_port_get_time(), z_vrfy_tgpio_port_get_cycles_per_second()) already performed that check, so the omission left one syscall unguarded. tgpio_pin_read_ts_ec() is declared __syscall, so with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y an unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to the TGPIO device object can invoke it with arbitrary pointer values. tgpio_intel_read_ts_ec() in drivers/timeaware_gpio/timeaware_gpio_intel.c bounds-checks only the pin index and then unconditionally performs timestamp = ... and event_count = ..., executing two 8-byte stores in supervisor mode at addresses chosen by the user-mode caller. The result is a write-what-where primitive that crosses the userspace/kernel boundary: the target address is fully attacker-chosen and the stored values are the hardware time-capture and event-counter register contents. Corrupting kernel d

취약점 유형

The Time-aware GPIO syscall verification handler z_vrfy_tgpio_pin_read_ts_ec() in drivers/timeaware_gpio/timeaware_gpio_handlers.c validated only the port device object and passed the caller-supplied timestamp and event_count output pointers to the driver without a K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE() check. The other handlers in the same file (z_vrfy_tgpio_port_get_time(), z_vrfy_tgpio_port_get_cycles_per_second()) already performed that check, so the omission left one syscall unguarded. tgpio_pin_read_ts_ec() is declared __syscall, so with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y an unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to the TGPIO device object can invoke it with arbitrary pointer values. tgpio_intel_read_ts_ec() in drivers/timeaware_gpio/timeaware_gpio_intel.c bounds-checks only the pin index and then unconditionally performs timestamp = ... and event_count = ..., executing two 8-byte stores in supervisor mode at addresses chosen by the user-mode caller. The result is a write-what-where primitive that crosses the userspace/kernel boundary: the target address is fully attacker-chosen and the stored values are the hardware time-capture and event-counter register contents. Corrupting kernel d

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