CVE-2026-40047
Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component. The camel-docling component invokes the external `docling` command-line tool by assembling an argument list in DoclingProducer and executing it through java.lang.ProcessBuilder. Custom CLI arguments supplied through the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` exchange header (a List<String>) were appended to that argument list with insufficient validation: the original implementation relied on a denylist of disallowed flags and only rejected path values that contained a literal `../` sequence. As a result, a Camel route that forwards externally-influenced data into the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` header (or into the path-bearing headers used to build the invocation) could cause the producer to pass unrecognized or unintended `docling` CLI flags to the subprocess, and could supply path-like argument values that resolved outside the intended directory through traversal sequences not caught by the literal `../` check. Because Camel itself builds the `docling` invocation from these values, the component is responsible for constraining them, and the weak validation
Słabość
Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') vulnerability in Apache Camel Docling component. The camel-docling component invokes the external `docling` command-line tool by assembling an argument list in DoclingProducer and executing it through java.lang.ProcessBuilder. Custom CLI arguments supplied through the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` exchange header (a List<String>) were appended to that argument list with insufficient validation: the original implementation relied on a denylist of disallowed flags and only rejected path values that contained a literal `../` sequence. As a result, a Camel route that forwards externally-influenced data into the `CamelDoclingCustomArguments` header (or into the path-bearing headers used to build the invocation) could cause the producer to pass unrecognized or unintended `docling` CLI flags to the subprocess, and could supply path-like argument values that resolved outside the intended directory through traversal sequences not caught by the literal `../` check. Because Camel itself builds the `docling` invocation from these values, the component is responsible for constraining them, and the weak validation
Produkty, których dotyczy
- apache camel
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