CVE-2026-64192
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitialized When CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is set, BPF inode storage maps (BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) are compiled into the kernel. However, if the BPF LSM is not explicitly enabled at boot time (e.g. omitted from the "lsm=" boot parameter), lsm_prepare() is never executed for the BPF LSM. Consequently, the BPF inode security blob offset (bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode) is never initialized and remains at its default compiled size of 8 bytes instead of being updated to a valid offset past the reserved struct rcu_head (typically 16 bytes or more). When a privileged user creates and updates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE map, bpf_inode() evaluates inode->i_security + 8. This erroneously aliases the struct rcu_head.func callback pointer at the beginning of the inode->i_security blob. During subsequent map element cleanup or inode destruction, writing NULL to owner_storage clears the queued RCU callback pointer. When rcu_do_batch() later executes the queued callback, it attempts an instruction fetch at address 0x0, triggering an immediate kernel panic. Fix this by int
Weakness
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE creation if BPF LSM is uninitialized When CONFIG_BPF_LSM=y is set, BPF inode storage maps (BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE) are compiled into the kernel. However, if the BPF LSM is not explicitly enabled at boot time (e.g. omitted from the "lsm=" boot parameter), lsm_prepare() is never executed for the BPF LSM. Consequently, the BPF inode security blob offset (bpf_lsm_blob_sizes.lbs_inode) is never initialized and remains at its default compiled size of 8 bytes instead of being updated to a valid offset past the reserved struct rcu_head (typically 16 bytes or more). When a privileged user creates and updates a BPF_MAP_TYPE_INODE_STORAGE map, bpf_inode() evaluates inode->i_security + 8. This erroneously aliases the struct rcu_head.func callback pointer at the beginning of the inode->i_security blob. During subsequent map element cleanup or inode destruction, writing NULL to owner_storage clears the queued RCU callback pointer. When rcu_do_batch() later executes the queued callback, it attempts an instruction fetch at address 0x0, triggering an immediate kernel panic. Fix this by int
Affected products
- linux linux_kernel
References
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/267fdd9b6530c399dfd996e1a0a7628b45baf9f0
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/413b14b9623a2e6ee131c2b2152b304aeb04e378
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5337eebdf8c5d4810b1913047f078d2815d5645f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/721f669853bdbf46b475a81bb5d05d610f8c19de
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6d634f794c808a261eac7d5af023a7e06b9ecd8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6f0643e4f63cfaa0d5d4a69de4f132eac4b8fe4
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