CVE-2026-77067

Weakness

The setWebhookResolver in packages/api/src/resolvers/webhooks/index.ts stores the caller-supplied url without any address validation, and the file imports no validation helper. When a subscribed event fires, callWebhook in packages/api/src/jobs/call_webhook.ts issues axios.request with that url, the method and Content-Type recorded on the webhook, and a JSON body carrying the event data, so an authenticated user can make the server send repeated attacker-shaped requests to internal endpoints, including link-local metadata addresses. The request is blind: callWebhook discards the result and writes only a success line or the axios error to the server log, so the response is not returned through the API.

References

• https://github.com/omnivore-app/omnivore
• https://github.com/omnivore-app/omnivore/blob/0d66408746788e07cec43928581b2567308ab575/packages/api/src/jobs/call_webhook.ts#L36
• https://github.com/omnivore-app/omnivore/blob/0d66408746788e07cec43928581b2567308ab575/packages/api/src/resolvers/webhooks/index.ts#L108
• https://github.com/omnivore-app/omnivore/commit/c4d7d8562e6b9aabb1d8e4dabca268e314baa43a
• https://github.com/omnivore-app/omnivore/issues/4647
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/omnivore-stored-server-side-request-forgery-via-the-setwebhook-mutation