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CVE-2026-89422

Key Exchange without Entity Authentication vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl allows a peer that answers a TLS 1.3 client connection to impersonate the intended server. A pre_shared_key extension in the ServerHello that the client never offered causes the client to complete the handshake without validating the server's certificate, so ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket} against a peer holding no certificate, no private key and no prior session. tls_client_connection_1_3:handle_server_hello/2 passes the received extension to tls_gen_connection_1_3:handle_resumption/2, which sets resumption = true on its mere presence without checking that the client offered a PSK. tls_handshake_1_3:get_pre_shared_key/4 meanwhile falls back to the all-zero "no PSK" value and keys the handshake with the ordinary non-PSK schedule, so the attacker's own ephemeral key suffices. The resumption flag then routes maybe_resumption/1 straight to wait_finished, skipping the certificate-handling states, so certificate path validation, verify_fun, hostname verification, partial_chain, CRL checking and OCSP stapling are all bypassed. The default client configuration is affected; clients restricted to TLS 1.2 are not. Th

CriticalCWE-322 All CVEs

Weakness

Key Exchange without Entity Authentication vulnerability in Erlang/OTP ssl allows a peer that answers a TLS 1.3 client connection to impersonate the intended server. A pre_shared_key extension in the ServerHello that the client never offered causes the client to complete the handshake without validating the server's certificate, so ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket} against a peer holding no certificate, no private key and no prior session. tls_client_connection_1_3:handle_server_hello/2 passes the received extension to tls_gen_connection_1_3:handle_resumption/2, which sets resumption = true on its mere presence without checking that the client offered a PSK. tls_handshake_1_3:get_pre_shared_key/4 meanwhile falls back to the all-zero "no PSK" value and keys the handshake with the ordinary non-PSK schedule, so the attacker's own ephemeral key suffices. The resumption flag then routes maybe_resumption/1 straight to wait_finished, skipping the certificate-handling states, so certificate path validation, verify_fun, hostname verification, partial_chain, CRL checking and OCSP stapling are all bypassed. The default client configuration is affected; clients restricted to TLS 1.2 are not. Th

References

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