CVE-2026-98104
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_u32: fix duplicate handle when node ID pool is exhausted gen_new_kid() falls back to returning max (htid | 0xFFF) when both idr_alloc_u32() ranges are full, instead of reporting an error. u32_change() trusts that value and inserts a new knode with a handle that is already live in the hash table, breaking handle uniqueness within the table's node ID space. The handle was never reserved in ht->handle_idr, so every later error path that does idr_remove(&ht->handle_idr, handle) removes the reservation of a different, live knode, which is then reused — one failed add compounds into further duplicates. The 4095 limit is per (table, bucket) — ht->handle_idr is per hash table and the range is derived from htid (bucketid), so a table with divisor 256 can legitimately hold 256*4095 knodes. The sibling helper gen_new_htid() has the same silent in-band failure: it returns 0 when the tp_c handle pool (1..0x7FF) is full, and u32_init() publishes the root hash table with handle 0 without checking. Two root tables with handle 0 alias in u32_lookup_ht(), allowing cross-tcf_proto knode add/lookup/delete. Add the same
Слабость
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: cls_u32: fix duplicate handle when node ID pool is exhausted gen_new_kid() falls back to returning max (htid | 0xFFF) when both idr_alloc_u32() ranges are full, instead of reporting an error. u32_change() trusts that value and inserts a new knode with a handle that is already live in the hash table, breaking handle uniqueness within the table's node ID space. The handle was never reserved in ht->handle_idr, so every later error path that does idr_remove(&ht->handle_idr, handle) removes the reservation of a different, live knode, which is then reused — one failed add compounds into further duplicates. The 4095 limit is per (table, bucket) — ht->handle_idr is per hash table and the range is derived from htid (bucketid), so a table with divisor 256 can legitimately hold 256*4095 knodes. The sibling helper gen_new_htid() has the same silent in-band failure: it returns 0 when the tp_c handle pool (1..0x7FF) is full, and u32_init() publishes the root hash table with handle 0 without checking. Two root tables with handle 0 alias in u32_lookup_ht(), allowing cross-tcf_proto knode add/lookup/delete. Add the same
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